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higher returns for unskilled wage labor. Finally, we examine the commodity-specific poverty 
impacts of trade reform for this sample of countries. We find that liberalization of food grains 
and other processed foods represent the largest contributions to poverty reduction. More 
specifically, it is tariff reform in these commodity markets that dominates the poverty increasing 
impacts of wealthy country subsidy removal.  
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The Poverty Impacts of  
Global Commodity Trade Liberalization 
 
Thomas W. Hertel and Roman Keeney 
 
 
Despite a lack of recent progress towards a multilateral trade reform agreement, the Doha 
Development Agenda negotiations of the WTO continue to generate interest for their poverty 
reduction potential. A distinguishing feature of the Doha Agenda was the lack of commitment to 
trade policy reform by developing countries – particularly the poorest countries which were 
offered “the round for free” (Anderson and Martin 2006). Recent research suggests that 
developing country tariff cuts – particularly in agriculture – are among the most poverty-friendly 
elements of a broader multilateral trade policy agenda (Hertel et al. 2009).  
Such analyses hinge critically on the measured protection for agriculture in developing 
countries. Unlike the OECD countries, where the measurement of agricultural protection has 
received considerable attention over the past two decades through the regular publication of 
“Producer Support Estimates” (PSE), there remained considerable uncertainty about current 
support and recent trends in agricultural protection in developing countries – particularly the 
smaller, low-income economies – until the new World Bank agricultural distortions database was 
compiled (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).  
In this chapter, we incorporate this new information on price distortions to assess the 
impact of agricultural and other trade reforms on poverty. These data on developing country 
protection in agriculture afford us the opportunity to consider the relative importance of 




1 Note that throughout this chapter, as with the rest of the book, non-agriculture includes highly processed foods and 2 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Tracing the impacts of developments in multilateral trade policy from international 
markets to the household level is a long and complex process (Winters et al. 2004). A natural 
method for accomplishing this is to divide the task up into parts. This approach is taken in Hertel 
and Winters (2006), where a global model is used to generate world price changes following 
various multilateral trade reform scenarios with national models rich in household level detail 
used to assess the ensuing national poverty impacts. This method allows separate modeling tools, 
with each working to its own comparative advantage. It has become widely accepted as the 
standard for definitively answering ex ante questions regarding the poverty impacts of trade 
reforms for a specific country.  
An inherent limitation of the country specific studies underlying the final poverty change 
estimates from this approach is the development of general conclusions regarding the broad 
pattern of poverty impacts. Are rich country reforms pro-poor on average? How do they compare 
to poor country reforms? For this purpose, it is important to assemble a household-survey based 
framework that is comparable across countries, and which permits us to say something about 
poverty impacts across a wide range of diverse economies that are representative of the 
developing world.  
This approach has been adopted by Ivanic (2006) and by Hertel et al. (2007) in their 
analyses of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). These authors conclude that the set of 
measures envisioned under the DDA
2 are less poverty friendly than the set of policy measures 
not being considered. Hertel et al. (2009) explore this question in detail and determine that an 
over-emphasis on export and domestic production subsidies relative to market access in the rich 
countries, together with the absence of commitments to deep agricultural tariff cuts in developing 
countries, are the primary culprits in diminishing the prospects for poverty reduction from the 
DDA. This international cross-section approach has proven especially fruitful for providing 
complementary insight to detailed country-specific studies, despite its relatively undifferentiated 
treatment of developing country household behavior. In addition to making use of the new 
 
beverages while farm goods that require light processing before they can be traded easily (such as rice, sugar, dairy 
products and meat) are included in agriculture. 
 
2 Specifically, they focus on an implementation of the July 2004 framework agreement of the WTO’s DDA. 3 
 
 
developing country protection estimates, we also examine the poverty impacts of trade reform 
through a different lens – namely that of commodity-specific support. Given that many political 
economy and distributional causes of agricultural protection are inherently commodity specific, 
viewing the trade/poverty link through the commodity lens in a comparative fashion represents 
an area of relative inattention and one that a global model with a diverse developing country 
sample is well-suited to address. For present purposes we focus on 15 developing countries: four 
African (Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia), five Asian (Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), and six Latin American (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela). 
 
Analytical approach to poverty modeling 
 
Our poverty analysis begins with the specification of a utility function and an associated 
consumer demand system for determining household consumption and the maximum utility 
attainable at a given level of prices and income. The utility of the household at the poverty line is 
defined as the poverty level of utility. Households with utility at or below this level are deemed 
to be in poverty. In this study, we follow Hertel et al. (2004) and Hertel et al. (2007) in using 
Rimmer and Powell’s (1992) AIDADS demand system to represent consumer preferences. The 
AIDADS demand system is particularly useful for poverty analysis because it lends itself to 
international cross-section estimation and devotes two-thirds of its parameters to consumption 
behavior in the neighborhood of the poverty line (Cranfield et al. 2003). 
Estimation of this demand system is undertaken using the 80 country, per capita 
consumption data set offered by GTAP version 6.1 and the resulting parameters are reported in 
Hertel et al. (2009). The demand system estimates are then calibrated reproduce base year per 
capita demands in each country following the approach of Golub and Hertel (2008).  
A key finding in the work of Hertel et al. (2004) is the importance of stratifying 
households by their primary source of income. Farm households in developing countries often 
rely on the farm enterprise for virtually all of their income, and the share of national poverty 4 
 
 
concentrated in agriculture-specialized households is large in the poorest countries in our sample 
– between one-quarter and one-half of the $1/day poverty line headcount in Chile, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.  
Not only are farm households in the poorest countries more likely to be specialized in 
farm earnings, these specialized farm households also tend to be poorer than the rest of the 
population (Hertel et al., 2004). The implication is that the poorest households in the poorest 
countries are more concentrated in agriculture and therefore more likely to benefit from producer 
price increases engendered by multilateral trade reforms. We follow Hertel et al. (2004) in 
identifying five household groups that rely almost exclusively (greater than 95 percent) on one 
source of income: agricultural self employment, non-agricultural self-employment, rural wage 
labor, urban wage labor, or transfer payments. The remaining households are grouped into rural 
or urban diversified strata, leading to seven total strata.
3  
Hertel et al. (2004) simulated the impact of trade reform on the full distribution of 
households within each of the seven strata using a global CGE model and a household micro-
simulation framework. Given our emphasis on poverty in this chapter, we follow Hertel et al. 
(2009) by focusing on the households in the neighborhood of the poverty line making use of a 
highly disaggregated poverty elasticity approach. Specifically, we compute the stratum-specific 
elasticity of the poverty headcount with respect to a change in average income in the stratum. We 
denote this elasticity  rs ε , and report the computed values for the fifteen countries in our sample 
in table 1. They range from a low of 0.0006 in the self-employed agriculture stratum in Zambia, 
where nearly all of the population is well below the poverty line, to a high of 3.63 in the urban 
diversified stratum of Brazil, where the population density at the poverty line is quite high.  
The proportional change in real income of households at the poverty line in stratum   of 
region 
s
r  can be written as the income–share weighted sum of these households’ real after-tax 
factor earnings: 
                                                 
3 A clear limitation of this approach stems from the rigidity of a given households’ classification by earnings 
specialization. Obviously households may be induced to change their specialization or diversify in response to 
changing relative factor returns. We believe that the relatively broad definition of strata circumvents this problem for 
the majority of households in the face of modest earnings changes. However, this important qualification is 
considered further in the results section below. 5 
 
 







rs C W y − =∑α                                      (1) 
where   is the share of income obtained from factor 
p
rsj α j  by households at the poverty line in 
stratum s of region r ,   is the proportional change in after-tax earnings of factor j in region r, 
and C  is the proportional change in the cost of living at the poverty line in region r, i.e. 
expenditure required to remain at the poverty level of utility. This is obtained by solving the 
AIDADS demand system for the expenditure required to remain at the poverty level of utility, 




 We can now express the proportional change in the poverty headcount in stratum s of 
region r as follows: 
ˆ ˆ
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The earnings shares at the poverty line, , will play a critical role in our analysis. Regardless of 
the household type (with the exception of transfer-dependent households), unskilled labor 
income tends to dominate these stratum-specific earnings shares (Hertel et al. 2009). For 
example, in the case of the agriculture-dependent households, most of the earnings show up in 
unskilled agricultural labor. In the case of rural diversified households, it is usually a mix of 
agricultural self-employed unskilled labor, unskilled wage labor and unskilled nonfarm (self-
employed) labor. The fact that these households are so poor means that they have little income 
from land or capital. 
p
rsj α
Having established the determinants of the stratum poverty headcount, we can now 
progress to the national poverty headcount, , which can be expressed as a function of the 
stratum headcounts and stratum populations 
r H
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where  . So the proportional change in national poverty headcount is:  ∑ =
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is the share of stratum s poverty in nationwide poverty in region r. These shares are reported in 
table 2 for our 15 focus countries. Agricultural specialized households and rural diversified 
households tend to dominate the poverty headcount, although exceptions are evident in 
Colombia, Venezuela and Peru where self-employed, non-agricultural households contain a large 
share of the poor.   
Combining equations (2) and (4) we get a useful expression for evaluating the change in 
the national poverty headcount in response to a small change in factor and commodity prices: 
( ) ˆ pp
rr s r s r s j r j
sj
H βε α =⋅ ⋅ − ∑∑ ˆ
r W C
r j ⋅
                                   (5) 
Since the expression in parentheses in equation (5) denotes the proportional change in real, after-
tax income associated with each of the factors of production ( ) we can rewrite this as:  ˆ R
rj W
ˆˆ pR
rr s r s r s j
sj
HW βεα =⋅ ⋅ ∑∑                                        (6)  
From equation (6) it is clear that, in order to obtain the change in national poverty, each real after 
tax factor return must be pre-multiplied by a region-, stratum-, and factor-specific poverty 
elasticity.  
  As an example, table 3 reports the product: 
p
rs rs rsj β εα ⋅ ⋅ for Bangladesh. The rows in this 
table correspond to strata and the columns to earnings types. Since ∑ =
j
rsj 1 α  , the row sums in 
this table simply give the elasticity of national poverty with respect to a one percent rise in 
stratum income, that is,  rs rs β ε ⋅ . These are obviously heavily influenced by the national poverty 
shares reported in the Bangladesh row of table 2. Since the rural diversified stratum comprises 
nearly 37 percent of the poor, it is not surprising that this row total is the largest in table 3. This 7 
 
 
is followed in importance by the self-employed agriculture and non-agriculture strata, which 
have relatively high stratum-specific poverty elasticities (recall the first row of table 1), then the 
rural labor stratum and the urban diversified stratum.  
The column sums in table 3 allow us to identify which factors are most important in 
poverty reduction in Bangladesh. In this case it is clear that unskilled labor is the primary 
endowment of the poor in Bangladesh. What matters is where these workers are employed, and 
how their relative wages will be affected by trade reform. Based on the bottom row in table 3, we 
see that unskilled wage labor is most important from a national poverty reduction point of view, 
followed closely by self-employed non-agricultural and agricultural unskilled labor. Transfer 
payments, skilled wage labor, capital and land, play a much smaller role in poverty reduction at 
the margin, according to the final row in table 3. The grand total in table 3 gives the national 
$1/day poverty elasticity (bottom right corner, 1.24) with respect to a uniform one percent rise in 
real, after-tax income from all sources.  
The first row of table 4 takes the final row of table 3 for Bangladesh and divides all the 
entries by 1.24 so that we have the share of each earnings source in national poverty reduction, 
given an across-the-board rise in real after-tax incomes. Thus, unskilled wage labor (the fifth 
column entry in row one) is shown to contribute 33 percent of the total, and so on. The remaining 
rows in table 4 provide the same calculation for the other fourteen developing countries in our 
sample.  
Treating each country as an observation, unskilled wage labor shows the highest average 
share (bottom row of table 4), followed by agricultural unskilled labor and then non-agricultural 
unskilled labor and transfers. Transfer payments are very important in some of the richer 
developing countries (Mexico, Thailand, Chile, Colombia, Brazil), as well as lower income 
countries with a large share of migrant labor (for example, Mozambique). The entries in table 4 
give a clear idea of which factor price increases are most likely to lower the national poverty 
headcount in each country. 
 




With the household level poverty impacts hinging critically on factor rewards that depend not 
only on the type of endowment but also where it is employed, we need a global modeling 
framework with enough detail to separate these differential returns. We adopt the GTAP model 
(Hertel 1997) and its version 6.1 database calibrated to 2001 (Dimaranan 2007)  and modify both 
to be consistent with our needs for differentiated factor returns as well as changes in price 
distortions identified in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and prepared for CGE modeling by 
Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). The date of the version 6.1 database also requires us to make 
some updates due to market conditions and policy reforms that have changed since 2001. The 
model is implemented in GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 1996). We now turn to a discussion 




Our starting point for the global CGE analysis of the impacts of trade policy is the GTAP version 
6.1 database (Dimaranan 2007). For present purposed we aggregate that to 31 productive sectors 
and 6 groups of household consumption items, following Ivanic (2006). We update this database 
by solving an experiment that accounts for key policy reforms to border protection that took 
place between 2001 and 2005 (most notably accession of China to the WTO, enlargement of the 
European Union, and completion of Uruguay Round commitments by some WTO members). We 
then alter the data base (now with a base year of 2005) to reflect the recent estimates of 
agricultural price distortions in developing countries from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). At 
the same time, we alter our database to reflect most recent OECD commodity support figures for 
agricultural output subsidies as of 2004. The aggregate changes in commodity support as 
measured by the PSE are relatively small over this time frame (OECD 2007). However, in some 
instances support to particular commodities changed dramatically. With an emphasis on viewing 
poverty impacts through a commodity lens, using the most recent available information on initial 9 
 
 
                                                
protection is warranted. In total this leads us to adjust twenty-five different OECD member 
output subsidy levels in our initial database.
4  
 
Modifications to the GTAP model  
 
Our modifications to the standard GTAP model focus on features that enhance analysis of 
agricultural reforms and simulation of poverty impacts. We retain the simplistic yet empirically 
robust assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition typically featured in 
agricultural trade studies.
5 The remaining modifications are aimed at permitting us to shed new 
light on the distributional consequences of trade reforms – focusing particularly on unraveling 
the puzzle of why such reform is not more poverty friendly.  
On the demand-side of the model, we ensure consistency with the poverty analysis by 
modifying the GTAP model to incorporate the AIDADS demand system as discussed in Hertel et 
al. (2007). Thus, aggregate preferences are consistent with the preferences used to evaluate the 
impact of price changes on households at the poverty line – although expenditure patterns differ 
across income levels due to the non-homotheticity of demands.  
The other modifications relate to the factor markets and follow from model changes made 
in Keeney and Hertel (2005). Frictions in agricultural factor markets have been prominently 
featured in the development economics literature, particularly as an explanation for low 
agricultural supply response (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991). Modeling the complex 
processes leading to limited farm/non-farm, rural/urban mobility for the full range of countries in 
our model is beyond the scope of this chapter, and as stated previously is better suited to the 
single country case study approach.  
 
4 We make adjustments to the output subsidy ad valorem rate in instances where the difference between OECD’s 
reported output subsidy rate in 2001 and 2004 differ by at least one percent. Most of the changes occur in the United 
States where the ad valorem output subsidy to rice falls by seventy-seven points and that for oilseeds falls by 
twenty-four. The year 2001 featured very low world prices for oilseeds and rice relative to 2004 and these 
commodities factor heavily in our updates of protection in the OECD countries. 
5 Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005) introduce monopolistic competition in the manufacturing sector into 
their analysis of WTO reforms. The resulting variety and scale effects generally boost the gains to rich countries and 
dampen the gains to poor countries from rich-country reforms. However, this makes their model less stable, and, 
given our focus on agricultural reforms, this feature seems less critical.  10 
 
 
                                                
To maintain a general framework that reflects imperfect factor mobility between rural 
and urban employment, we specify a constant elasticity of transformation function which 
“transforms” farm-employed factors into non-farm employment and vice-versa.
6 This permits 
factor rewards to diverge between the farm and non-farm sectors and supplies us with the factor 
market segmentation we require for our distributional analysis. We use the factor supply 
parameters adopted in Keeney and Hertel (2005) and drawn from the OECD (2001).  
We assume that aggregate endowment levels are fixed in our static analysis, reflecting the 
belief that the aggregate supply of factors is unaffected by trade policy. This is not the ‘full 
employment’ assumption sometimes ridiculed by advocates of structural models of development. 
Rather, it holds that aggregate employment is primarily determined by factors such as labor 
market norms and regulation that are largely independent of trade policy in the long run.  
Recalling equation (6), we must tie our results to the factor earnings shares for all 
household types in each region. We map the factor returns from the general equilibrium model to 
those different earnings types in the following way. Agricultural labor and capital receive the 
corresponding farm factor returns from the general equilibrium model, as do non-agricultural 
labor and capital. Wage labor in the household surveys is not distinguished as to place of 
employment so we use the economy-wide average change. Transfer payments represent an 
important source of earnings for many households and have no obvious corollary from the CGE 
model. We choose to index these to the growth rate in net national income, which allows us to 
maintain consistency with the representative household approach of the global model (see Hertel 
et al. 2007).  
Finally, a few words about our macro-closure are in order. In this chapter, we fix the ratio 
of key macro-economic aggregates relative to net national income. These include: government 
spending, total tax revenues (net of subsidies), net national savings and the trade balance. In this 
way, we also ensure that public transfer payments (not explicitly modeled in this study) are 
implicitly fixed relative to net national income. This provides a convenient method for indexing 
the transfer payments accruing to households. Since tariff liberalization typically results in a 
 
6 Land in the GTAP database is specific to agriculture. There we model imperfect mobility across agricultural uses 
so as to represent the cost of converting land from one use to another. 11 
 
 
                                                
reduction in tax revenues, a replacement tax is needed. In this chapter, we assume that income 
taxes on all earnings rise by an equal proportion in order to ensure that tax revenues remain fixed 
relative to net national income. Of course in those rich countries where tariffs are low and 
agricultural subsidies are high, this tax rate may fall in the wake of trade liberalization. While we 
do not believe that the income tax will be the replacement tax of choice in many economies – 
particularly the poorest economies – it is a convenient tool to use and we do not have enough 
detail on the tax structure in many of these economies to greatly improve on this simple 
assumption. As we will see below, omission of the tax replacement effect has a dramatic effect 
on our poverty results, highlighting this as a key issue for consideration in the country specific 
case studies in this volume and elsewhere. 
 
Model results and discussion 
 
In this chapter we report the results of just one core simulation: the removal globally of all 
agricultural production and export subsidies and all merchandise trade taxes, both agricultural 
and non-agricultural.
7 Table 5 reports our estimates of the percentage change in national poverty 
headcount for each of our focus countries as it arises from this global liberalization simulation. 
We use the decomposition method of Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (2000) to identify the 
impacts of agricultural and non-agricultural policy reform separately from the total in percentage 
terms. We also provide level changes (in thousands) in the national poverty headcount (column 
four of table 5).  
 
Impacts of the new price distortions data  
 
 
7 More specifically, our global liberalization includes removal of all border measures (export subsidies as well as 
trade taxes) in all regions of the model and removal of all input and output subsidies in agriculture in the OECD and 
for those developing countries where Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) provide new information. 12 
 
 
Table 5 offers a comparison of the total poverty reduction based on previous work (Hertel et al. 
2009), which did not feature the distortion estimates compiled by Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008), nor the updated OECD estimates for member country protection. By comparing columns 
3 and 5 in table 5, we see mostly small differences in the percentage change in the poverty 
headcount from the current study (column 3) compared to those produced previously (column 5). 
However, some differences are worth noting. For Colombia, previous results indicated that 
global liberalization would lead to a slight increase in poverty (a 0.1 percent increase in the 
national headcount) whereas the current results now anticipate that global trade reform will lead 
to a slight poverty reduction. Colombia is one of the countries where the information on 
agricultural protection changed significantly due to incorporation of the Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) estimates. More significantly, predicted poverty reduction in Indonesia is 
somewhat lower, and in Brazil somewhat higher, than the poverty reduction previously reported. 
 
The crucial role of tax replacement  
 
The last two columns of table 5 present differing estimates of the predicted poverty changes that 
follow when we alter the assumption about tax adjustments. One variant is to assume that the 
poor are not subjected to the income tax replacement mechanism. Another is to use an alternative 
tax replacement instrument, namely a value added tax. This permits our results to be compared 
with studies in which different assumptions are made in this matter, and it highlights the 
importance of the tax replacement assumption on predicted changes in poverty. 
Column 6 of table 5 reports the percentage change in the national poverty headcount 
when the poor are not subject to the replacement income tax. This is the assumption made by 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) in their analysis of the poverty impacts of 
the Doha Development Agenda. As can be seen, this presents a marked difference in the 
predicted poverty alleviation. Trade reforms go from being marginally poverty reducing in most 
cases to being universally poverty reducing by a considerable magnitude. It reduces the poverty 
rate by roughly one-quarter in Thailand and Vietnam, for example. In this scenario, the poor are 13 
 
 
being given access to commodities or are able to sell them at undistorted prices without having to 
directly bear any of the tax burden of replacing the lost tariff revenue. In effect, this represents a 
very significant implicit income transfer from non-poor to poor households. We do not argue that 
such a fiscal transfer is a bad thing of course, as it would have tremendous poverty reduction 
benefits. However, we do not believe it is the measure most likely to be used, as most developing 
countries seeking to make up for lost tariff revenue resort to a value added tax (VAT).  
The final column in table 5 reports the poverty results when we replace the lost tariff 
revenue through adjusting the VAT. However, care is needed when adjusting that tax, because 
some sectors are VAT-exempt (public consumption, for example, and often basic foods). In this 
alternative scenario we adjust it through an equi-proportional adjustment in the power of the 
consumption tax (i.e., one plus the consumption tax rate) on taxable items in each focus country. 
This might be viewed as equivalent in effect to a value-added tax replacement experiment when 
the VAT applies to all imports and exempts all exports. However, when the existing 
consumption tax structure is already distorted (as is the case in our model, for example due to 
exempting some sectors), this replacement consumption tax exacerbates these distortions. In 
particular, since it does not apply to public consumption, it distorts the allocation of resources 
between public and private consumption. Therefore, in our framework this VAT scenario is 
expected to give less beneficial outcomes in terms of poverty reduction than the core scenario. 
And indeed that is confirmed by the comparison of column3 and 7 of table 5: when lost tariff 
revenue is replaced with a consumption tax instead of an income tax, the poverty gains are more 
modest, and the mix of countries reducing poverty changes slightly.  
 
Summary of poverty impacts 
 
 Returning to the main set of results from this study (columns 1, 2 and 3 of table 5) we report in 
the final three rows the summary measures introduced by Ivanic (2006).Specifically, we compute 
first the Average Value across countries (treating each country as an “observation” with equal 
weight), then the Average Absolute Value – which shows how important a given change is 14 
 
 
regardless of sign, and finally the ratio of these two (AV/AAV = SC = Sign Consistency). Note 
that the latter – which may be viewed as the tendency for trade reforms to reduce (or increase) 
poverty – is constructed such that -1 ≤ SC≤+1. When SC = -1, a given trade reform (or set of 
reforms) is poverty reducing for all countries in the sample since the average change and 
absolute value of the changes will be of the same magnitude and opposite sign. 
From the average across countries, we see that our current results, using updated 
protection data, predict larger poverty alleviating impacts in developing countries than the 
previous analysis (AV of -1.71 versus -1.59), and a slightly increased prevalence of poverty 
reducing impacts across countries in our sample (AAV of -0.84 versus -0.81). In summary, the 
results predict that full global trade liberalization would reduce poverty in ten of the 15 focus 
countries. Even ignoring the growth-enhancing effects of trade reform (which are not included in 
our comparative static framework), this would lift no less than 816,000 people out of poverty.  
The decomposition of total impacts between agricultural and non-agricultural reforms 
(first two columns of table 5) show that the global agricultural reforms have more than twice the 
impact on the poor as do non-agricultural reforms (AAVag of 1.78 versus AAVnonag of 0.71). 
Furthermore, the agricultural reforms are nearly always poverty reducing (SC = -0.93), whereas 
the non-agricultural reforms tend to be only marginally poverty reducing in this sample of 
countries (SC = -0.07). Of the five countries experiencing poverty increases in the wake of ag 
and nonag trade reforms combined, Mexico and Bangladesh are the most important in terms of 
absolute numbers (more than 100,000 in each case). These are countries that currently enjoy 
preferential market access in their most important markets (the United States for Mexico and the 
European Union for Bangladesh). Global trade liberalization results in substantial preference 
erosion for both countries in these preferred markets.  
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As we seek to understand the differential impact of trade reforms across products, we begin by 
focusing on the difference between the poverty impacts of agricultural and non-agricultural 
reforms, then turn to the individual commodity decomposition of agricultural reforms.  
A natural way to investigate the difference between farm and non-farm reforms is via the 
decomposition proposed in equation (6). Since the elasticities in this expression are the same 
(initially) for both experiments, the entire difference in the poverty headcount change is 
accounted for by real after-tax wage changes. Specifically, we have the following decomposition 
of the difference in poverty headcount, by region: 
                                                 (7)  , ˆˆ (
pR R
r diff rs rs rsj rj agr rj nagr
sj
HW βεα =⋅ ⋅ − ∑∑
where  is the real after-tax change in earnings, for endowment j in region r, owing to 
agricultural reforms and  is the non-agricultural counterpart. Our first task is to explain 
why the earnings are differentially affected, then consider how these changes interact with the 





  Table 6 reports the values of  for all earnings sources and all focus 
regions in our analysis. It happens that, relative to non-agricultural trade reforms, agricultural 
trade reforms raise returns to farming in all of our focus developing countries. They also raise 
returns to unskilled wage labor, relative to non-agricultural reforms, in most countries, as the 
unskilled labor-intensive agricultural sector expands and boosts unskilled wages. (Indonesia, 
Mexico and Vietnam are the exceptions, in which non-agricultural reforms exert a stronger 
influence on unskilled wages.) Agricultural reforms are less favorable for skilled labor, but this 
factor’s reward is relatively unimportant for the poor (recall table 4). 
,, ˆˆ (
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  Continuing across the columns in table 6, we see that agricultural reforms often (but not 
always) lead to relatively lower real after-tax earnings than non-agricultural reforms for self-
employed non-agricultural endowments, as we see many negative entries in columns 7 to 9. The 
fact that transfers (by assumption) are indexed to net national income and not the cost of living at 
the poverty line means that food price-increasing agricultural reforms tend to hurt the transfer-16 
 
 
dependent households, relative to non-agricultural reforms(column 10). This is due to the 
relatively large share of food expenditures in the consumption baskets of the poorest households. 
  Taking into account the aggregate poverty elasticities with respect to factor earnings, 
reported in table 4, it is not immediately clear why the pattern of earnings differences from table 
6 results in agricultural trade reforms dominating non-agricultural reforms as a poverty reduction 
tool. This depends on the responsiveness of the national poverty headcount to each of these 
earnings sources. We can gain more insight into this by moving to table 7, which reports the 
poverty elasticity weighted counterparts to the earnings differences reported in table 6, that is, 
.   ,, ˆˆ ()
pR R
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When we sum across a row in table 7 (i.e., sum over all endowments in a given region), 
we get the percentage difference in poverty headcount stemming from agricultural and non-
agricultural reforms (subject to rounding error due to the differencing of percentages, which is 
why these entries differ from the simple difference between the first two columns of table 5). 
From the final column in table 7, we can see that, in all countries except Mexico and Vietnam, 
agricultural reforms are more poverty friendly than non-agricultural reforms.  
What is special about Mexico and Vietnam? We note that these are two of the three 
countries where real after-tax unskilled wages rise more under non-agricultural trade reforms 
(the other is Indonesia, see table 6). Unlike Indonesia, where the share of the poor in agriculture-
specialized households is about 40 percent (recall table 2), Mexico and Vietnam show relatively 
low shares of agricultural households in total poverty. Both of these countries have relatively 
high shares of rural diversified households in poverty that rely heavily on unskilled wage labor, 
which is more favorably affected by non-agricultural trade reforms.  
While higher returns to unskilled family labor in agriculture represent the dominant 
driver of agricultural relative to non-agricultural poverty reduction in most countries, there are 
some important exceptions. In Bangladesh and Zambia, where agricultural reforms have a more 
favorable impact on poverty than do non-agricultural reforms, this is largely due to the wage 
labor channel. And in the Philippines, peasant households benefit relatively more from higher 




  We also examine the relative impact of agriculture and non-agriculture trade reforms on 
poverty by stratum. This is shown in table 8 which reports the elements of 
 for all 15 countries and all 7 strata. The columns now refer to 
strata and each element represents the combined impact of all earnings changes (adjusted for 
taxes and cost of living changes) on national poverty – through changes in poverty in the 
individual household strata. Once again, the final column records the difference between 
agricultural and non-agricultural reforms on the percentage change in national poverty 
headcount. Here we see that agricultural trade reforms reduce poverty among agriculture-
specialized households in nearly all countries (note that SC, the ratio of the average and absolute 
average headcount, is -1.00 under this stratum).  
,, ˆˆ (
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The contribution of the agricultural stratum to national poverty reduction is negligible 
only in Vietnam and Mexico, and these are the only two countries where poverty falls more for 
diversified rural households following non-agricultural trade reforms than under agricultural 
reforms (leading to positive entries in the rural diversified column of table 8). In both Vietnam 
and Mexico, all of the non-agricultural household strata contribute to greater poverty reductions 
under multilateral non-agricultural reforms than under agricultural reforms.   
 
Understanding the poverty impacts by farm commodity 
 
Given the importance of agricultural reform, we now turn to the task of decomposing the poverty 
impacts by agricultural commodity. Table 9 decomposes the agricultural poverty reduction in 
table 5 into its component parts – in this case breaking it out by the global commodity market in 
which reform is taking place. Thus, the first set of columns reports the percentage change in 
national poverty headcount due to global reforms in the food grains sector. From this, we see 
that, with the exception of Vietnam (and Mexico and Venezuela, where there is no effect), 
liberalization in food grain markets is generally poverty reducing. The disaggregation of the 
foodgrains reforms by instrument reveals that tariff cuts in foodgrains – as well as feedgrains 
which are also shown in table 10 – are universally poverty-reducing (sign consistency index of -18 
 
 
1). Where poverty rises due to reforms in food or feed grains for a country, it is due to the 
adverse price impacts that arise from elimination of export subsidies and domestic support (see 
the Export Subsidies and Domestic Subsidies columns in table 10). Outside of foodgrains, the 
most poverty-friendly reforms are those in other crops. These include many of the tropical 
products for which developing countries are net exporters. Due to space only foodgrains and 
feedgrains are reported here, but an all-commodity ranking on “poverty-friendliness” as we have 
defined it here would order as follows: food grains, other food and beverages, other crops, meats, 
sugar, feed grains, cotton and dairy. In terms of absolute size of poverty impacts, liberalization of 
other crops is the most significant, followed by food grains and then meats. 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
 
This chapter offers a complementary perspective to the detailed country case studies of trade 
reform and poverty provided by others in this volume. By looking at a wide range of developing 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, we offer some more general conclusions about the 
poverty impacts of commodity trade reform. We find that, overall, trade reform tends to reduce 
poverty, and it does so due to the agricultural trade reform components of the total package of 
reforms. Indeed, non-agricultural trade reforms tend to increase poverty in most of our focus 
developing countries.  
  We explore the relative poverty-friendliness of agricultural trade reforms in more detail, 
by examining their differential impacts (relative to nonagricultural reforms) on real after-tax 
factor returns, and on poverty by stratum. Overall, the more favorable impacts of agricultural 
reforms are driven by the increased factor rewards for peasant farms as well as higher returns for 
unskilled wage labor, evaluated relative to the real cost of living at the poverty line. Finally, we 
examine the poverty impacts of trade reform by agricultural commodity groups across this 
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Labor  Transfer  Urban 
Diverse 
Rural 
Diverse   
Bangladesh   1.64  2.02  1.58 0.63 0.56 1.74 1.09  1.24
Brazil   0.75  1.28  1.94 2.19 0.34 3.63 2.69  1.35
Chile   1.90  2.24  2.06 1.55 2.45 2.29 2.60  2.18
Colombia   0.79  0.60  1.73 1.72 0.93 1.14 1.00  0.82
Indonesia   2.35  2.14  2.38 2.89 1.17 2.58 2.87  2.47
Malawi   0.49  0.30  2.26 1.97 0.43 1.04 0.76  0.58
Mexico   1.73  1.90  3.33 2.08 2.28 1.63 1.80  2.02
Mozambique   0.28 0.94  0.97 0.76 0.48 1.58 0.99  0.64
Peru   1.50  1.32  2.37 1.73 0.44 1.09 1.05  1.07
Philippines   2.25  1.96  2.98 2.44 1.69 2.42 1.98  2.15
Thailand   2.30  2.42  2.98 2.45 2.78 2.42 2.59  2.57
Uganda   0.28  0.40  1.71 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.21  0.24
Venezuela   0.69  1.16  2.57 2.17 0.01 1.72 1.53  1.20
Vietnam   0.48  1.12  2.81 8.98 0.84 0.86 1.01  0.98
Zambia   0.00  0.64  2.28 0.91 0.45 1.29 0.37  0.61
Notes: Values in strata columns are elasticities of the poverty headcount with respect to changes 
in earnings. National elasticity in the final column is the poverty share weighted (see table 2) 
aggregate elasticity for each country. Elasticities estimated by authors using country specific 
household survey data. For the first 5strata, more than 95 percent of household income comes 
from just one source. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 





















Bangladesh   0.15  0.13  0.04 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.37  1.00 
Brazil   0.14  0.09  0.24 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.03  1.00 
Chile   0.26  0.01  0.09 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.12  1.00 
Colombia   0.28  0.43  0.03 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.04  1.00 
Indonesia   0.42  0.12  0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.28  1.00 
Malawi   0.54  0.11  0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.25  1.00 
Mexico   0.05  0.06  0.05 0.12 0.28 0.14 0.29  1.00 
Mozambique   0.41 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.19  1.00 
Peru   0.07  0.35  0.01 0.02 0.22 0.11 0.23  1.00 
Philippines   0.12  0.06  0.03 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.49  1.00 
Thailand   0.06  0.02  0.00 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.68  1.00 
Uganda   0.10  0.04  0.00 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.75  1.00 
Venezuela   0.08  0.24  0.17 0.10 0.28 0.08 0.05  1.00 
Vietnam   0.04  0.11  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.70  1.00 
Zambia   0.34  0.23  0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11  1.00 
Notes: Values are shares of the impoverished population that are specialized in a particular 
stratum of earnings. Shares are derived from country-specific household surveys. Total column 
reflects that entire poverty population is allocated among the seven strata. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 




























Agric.  0.01  0.23 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
Non-Agric. 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.26
Urban  Labor  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Rural  Labor  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Transfer  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Urban 
Diverse  0.00  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12
Rural 
Diverse  0.00  0.07 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.40
Total  0.01  0.33 0.00 0.01 0.41 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.02 0.07 1.24
Notes: Elasticities are calculated by multiplying earnings shares by stratum specific elasticities for Bangladesh. Total column gives the 
change in stratum poverty for a one percent increase in income by that household type. Total row gives the national change in poverty 
from a one percent increase in factor income of the column type.  
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
Table 4. Earnings Contributions to Total Poverty Response across Countries (1$/day)  




























Bangladesh 0.01  0.27 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.06 1.00
(1.24)
Brazil  0.00  0.07 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.15 1.00
(1.35)
Chile  0.07  0.15 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00
(2.18)
Colombia  0.00  0.29 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.01 0.16 1.00
(0.82)
Indonesia  0.03  0.50 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.03 1.00
(2.47)
Malawi  0.03  0.52 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.14 1.00
(0.58)
Mexico  0.00  0.09 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.00
(2.02)
Mozambique  0.00  0.35 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.20 1.00
(0.64)
Peru  0.01  0.16 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.45 0.07 0.06 0.14 1.00
(1.07)
Philippines 0.23  0.00 0.01 0.12 0.31 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.10 1.00
(2.15)
Thailand  0.03  0.20 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.38 1.00
(2.57)




Venezuela  0.00  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.03 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.05 1.00
(1.20)
Vietnam  0.01  0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.47 0.20 1.00
(0.98)
Zambia  0.00  0.02 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.08 1.00
(0.61)
Average  0.04  0.19 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.17 --
Notes: Values are earnings specific elasticities divided by national elasticity (in parentheses in Total column). Average row is the 
simple average across countries of the contribution of a specific earnings source to total poverty responsiveness. Total column reflects 
the fact that contributions to total responsiveness add up to 1. National poverty elasticities are given in parentheses in the total column.  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Table 5. Summary Poverty Impacts of Global Reforms  
(percentage change in Headcount) 





















Bangladesh   -0.25  0.51  0.26 116 0.28 -5.30 -0.01
Brazil   -2.53  0.38  -2.15 -50 -1.41 -10.00 -1.42
Chile   -4.76  0.12  -4.64 -14 -4.99 -12.25 -4.79
Colombia   -0.72  0.63  -0.09 -3 0.10 -4.05 0.03
Indonesia   -1.05  0.49  -0.56 -84 -1.45 -5.23 -0.53
Malawi   -1.64  -0.26  -1.91 -81 -1.84 -5.62 -1.31
Mexico   0.78  0.35  1.13 105 1.35 -0.48 1.15
Mozambique   -1.15  0.15  -1.00 -61 -0.69 -4.34 0.29
Peru   -0.64  -0.16  -0.80 -35 -0.79 -5.24 -0.67
Philippines   -1.37  0.42  -0.95 -108 -0.75 -6.39 -1.92
Thailand   -11.19  0.93  -10.26 -121 -8.87 -28.05 -5.83
Uganda   -0.01  0.09  0.09 15 0.06 -5.96 0.09
Venezuela   0.15  0.71  0.86 28 0.86 -2.12 1.14
Vietnam   -0.48  -5.26  -5.74 -88 -5.85 -23.58 -6.96
Zambia   -0.02  0.13  0.11 7 0.09 -2.00 1.25
Average (AV)  -1.66 -0.05  -1.71 na -1.59 -8.04  -1.30
Abs. Av. (AAV)  1.78 0.71  2.04 na 1.96 8.04  1.83
Sign Con. (SC)  -0.93 -0.07  -0.84 na -0.81 -1.00  -0.71
 
Notes: Results from authors’ simulations using GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson 
1996) and the GTAP database (Dimaranan 2007). Agricultural and non-agricultural reform 
impacts add to total percentage change in poverty. We use the subtotal routine in GEMPACK 
developed by Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson (2000) to isolate these portions of the total 
impact. Level change is the calculated number of persons moving out of poverty given the initial 1 
 
 
headcount and predicted percentage change. The ‘Different data’ simulation uses the GTAP 
version 6 (base year 2001) protection data with the modifications made in Hertel et al. (2007, 
2009). The ‘Different tax replacement (poor are exempt)’ scenario assumes that the poor are not 
subject to the higher income tax needed to replace lost tariff revenue. The ‘Different tax 
replacement (VAT)’ scenario replaces lost tariff revenue with a consumption tax which can be 
viewed as equivalent to a VAT under which imports are taxed and exports exempted. Average 
(AV) is the simple average of percentage changes while Abs. Av. (AAV) is the simple average 
of the absolute value of individual percentage changes. Sign Con. (SC)measures the consistency 
between the direction of effects and the level of impact and is calculated as the ratio of the 
average to the absolute average, AA/AAV (Ivanic 2006). 
 
 
Source: Authors’ model simulations. 
 





























Bangladesh 0.33  0.38 0.95 0.86 0.56 1.68 0.62 1.69 1.52 1.17
Brazil 40.01  16.35  15.10 14.81 1.34 -0.75 -0.72  -0.91 -1.58 -0.13
Chile 15.35  7.57  6.93 6.74 0.29 -0.86 -1.03  -0.88 -1.33 -0.85
Colombia  8.22  4.40 3.97 3.49 1.10 0.30 0.36 0.30 -0.81 0.35
Indonesia 3.87  1.76  1.59 1.49 -0.50 -0.83 -1.53  -0.86 -1.09 -0.59
Malawi  4.76  3.20 2.68 2.82 1.75 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.68 1.21
Mexico  -0.18  -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 -0.10 -0.21 -0.10 -0.20 -0.26
Mozambique 8.58  4.93  3.52 4.16 1.42 -1.41 -0.18  -1.43 -0.50 0.60
Peru 12.95  6.94  5.69 5.92 1.07 -1.25 -1.44  -1.49 -0.92 -0.11
Philippines 3.07  1.68 1.53 1.21 0.35 0.07 -0.56 0.03 -0.67 -0.36
Thailand 34.07 17.46  14.29 12.92 4.19 -1.59 -2.01  -1.99 -4.38 -2.11
Uganda  0.62  0.50 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.20 0.37
Venezuela  0.87  0.68 0.70 0.44 0.49 0.55 0.46 0.55 0.01 -0.11
Vietnam 15.75  3.87  3.89 5.83 -9.07 -8.93 -12.81  -8.93 -4.87 -6.40
Zambia  4.00  1.87 1.60 1.47 0.56 0.03 0.17 0.02 -0.49 -0.15
Average (AV)  10.15 4.76  4.19 4.17 0.25 -0.80 -1.19  -0.86 -0.96 -0.49
Abs.Av.(AAV)  10.17  4.78 4.20 4.18 1.55 1.30 1.54 1.35 1.28 0.98
Sign Con. (SC)  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.16 -0.62 -0.77  -0.64 -0.75 -0.50
Notes: See Notes to table 5 for simulation information. Results are the difference in impacts on real, after-tax earnings by endowment 
from agricultural and non-agricultural reforms.         Source: Authors’ model simulations. 
 
 
Table 7. Earnings-Specific Poverty Change Differences Between Agricultural and Non-agricultural Reforms  




























Bangladesh  0.00  -0.12  0.00 -0.01 -0.23 -0.05 -0.22 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.76
Brazil -0.10  -1.43  -0.60  -0.15 -1.09 0.04 0.10 0.00  0.00 0.03 -3.21
Chile -2.30  -2.45  0.00  -1.48 -0.16 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.00 0.75 -5.60
Colombia  0.00  -1.07 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -1.38
Indonesia -0.30  -2.16  -0.02  -0.08 0.23 0.02 0.66 0.01  0.10 0.05 -1.49
Malawi  -0.10  -0.95  0.00 -0.11 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 -1.43
Mexico  0.00  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.43
Mozambique -0.04  -1.12  0.00  -0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.05 -0.08 -1.31
Peru -0.12  -1.17  0.00  -0.07 -0.11 0.01 0.70 0.11  0.06 0.02 -0.59
Philippines -1.54  -0.01 -0.04 -0.32 -0.23 0.00 0.17 0.00  0.09 0.08 -1.79
Thailand -2.95 -9.08  -0.89  -0.54 -2.55 0.21 0.21 0.03  0.13 2.06 -13.38
Uganda  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10
Venezuela  0.00  -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.34 -0.02 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.56
Vietnam -0.17 -0.45  0.00  -0.03 0.01 0.00 2.27 0.01  2.24 1.31 5.20
Zambia -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.00  0.04 0.01 -0.15
Average (AV)  -0.51 -1.34  -0.10  -0.19 -0.32 0.01 0.24 0.01  0.18 0.28 -1.74
Abs.Av.(AAV)  0.51  1.34 0.10 0.19 0.38 0.02 0.32 0.01 0.19 0.32 2.49
Sign Con. (SC)  -1.00 -1.00  -1.00  -1.00 -0.86 0.53 0.77 0.93  0.95 0.87 -0.70
Notes: See Notes to table 5 for simulation information. Results correspond with equation (7) and are the difference in impacts on poverty by 
endowment from agricultural and non-agricultural reforms.     Source: Authors’ model simulations. 
 
Table 8. Stratum Specific Poverty Change Differences between Agricultural and Non-
agricultural Reforms  
 
(contribution to percentage change in national headcount) 
 





Labor  Transfer  Urban 
Diverse 
Rural 
Diverse  Total 
Bangladesh  -0.10 -0.17  -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.27  -0.76
Brazil  -1.67  0.08 -0.55 -0.40 0.01 -0.46  -0.23 -3.21
Chile  -4.47  0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.58 -0.97  -0.67 -5.60
Colombia -0.98 -0.09  -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06  -1.38
Indonesia -1.76  0.39  0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.23  -1.49
Malawi  -0.86 -0.02  0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.40  -1.43
Mexico  0.01 0.02  0.03 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.10  0.43
Mozambique  -0.58  0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.21  -0.45 -1.31
Peru  -0.68  0.64 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.18  -0.33 -0.59
Philippines  -0.62  0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.41  -0.77 -1.79
Thailand -2.62 0.09  -0.05 -0.57 0.63 -0.94  -9.94  -13.38
Uganda -0.01  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.06  -0.10
Venezuela  -0.04 -0.13  -0.21 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.03  -0.56
Vietnam -0.08 1.16  0.00 0.00 0.27 0.11 3.74  5.20
Zambia  0.00  0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.04  -0.01 -0.15
Average (AV)  -0.96  0.14 -0.07 -0.09 0.11 -0.22  -0.64 -1.74
Abs.Av.(AAV)  0.97 0.20  0.08 0.11 0.12 0.24 1.15  2.49
Sign Con. (SC)  -1.00  0.72 -0.91 -0.82 0.86 -0.91  -0.56 -0.70
 
Notes: See Notes to table 5 for simulation information. Results correspond with equation (7) and 
are the difference in impacts on poverty by household type from agricultural and non-agricultural 
reforms.       
 Source: Authors’ model simulations.1 
 
Table 9. Percentage Change in Poverty by Commodity Specific Reform  











Bangladesh -0.07  -0.16  -0.02 -0.18 0.11 0.04 0.02 
Brazil -0.29  -0.20  -0.20 -0.01 -0.27 0.01 -1.56 
Chile -0.18  -0.04  -0.03 0.03 -3.11 -0.40 -1.03 
Colombia -0.11  0.06  -0.08 0.01 -0.55 -0.09 0.04 
Indonesia -0.09  0.00  0.29 0.00 -0.36 -0.03 -0.86 
Malawi -0.14  0.02  0.05 -0.04 -1.51 -0.02 0.00 
Mexico 0.00  0.48  0.03 0.06 0.23 -0.03 0.02 
Mozambique -0.10  -0.17 -0.53 -0.08 -0.36 -0.01 0.09 
Peru -0.07  0.01  -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.60 
Philippines -0.20  -0.23  -0.01 -0.07 -0.79 0.11 -0.19 
Thailand -5.63  -0.91  -0.88 0.06 -2.89 0.01 -0.93 
Uganda -0.01  -0.02  0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Venezuela 0.00  0.02  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Vietnam 0.03  -0.40  -0.07 0.00 -0.18 0.13 0.01 
Zambia -0.01  -0.04  0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 
Average (AV)  -0.46 -0.11  -0.10 -0.01 -0.64 -0.01 -0.33 
Abs.Av.(AAV)  0.46 0.18  0.15 0.04 0.70 0.06 0.36 
Sign Con. (SC)  -0.99 -0.57  -0.65 -0.31 -0.92 -0.23 -0.90 
 
Notes: See Notes to table 5 for simulation information. Results correspond with equation (7) and 
are the impacts on national poverty reforms in different agricultural sectors. 
Source: Authors’ model simulations.
  
 
Table 10. Poverty Impacts by Instrument for Food Grains and Feed Grains  
(percentage change in national headcount) 
 












Bangladesh -0.02  -0.02  -0.03 -0.07 -0.17 0.00  0.01 -0.16
Brazil -0.31  0.01  0.01 -0.29 -0.07 -0.01  -0.13 -0.20
Chile -0.22  -0.01  0.05 -0.18 0.00 -0.02  -0.02 -0.04
Colombia -0.14 0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.12 0.03 0.14 0.06
Indonesia -0.18 0.01 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00
Malawi  -0.18 0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02
Mexico  -0.16 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.44 0.01 0.92 0.48
Mozambique -0.13  0.01  0.02 -0.10 -0.17 0.00  -0.01 -0.17
Peru  -0.11 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01
Philippines  -0.34 0.02 0.12 -0.20 -0.31 0.01 0.08 -0.23
Thailand -5.45  -0.03  -0.15 -5.63 -1.09 0.00  0.18 -0.91
Uganda  -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Venezuela  -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02
Vietnam  -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.44 0.02 0.01 -0.40
Zambia  -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.04
Average (AV)  -0.49 0.00 0.03 -0.46 -0.20 0.01 0.09 -0.11
Abs.Av.(AAV)  0.49 0.01 0.05 0.46 0.20 0.01 0.11 0.18
Sign Con. (SC)  -1.00 0.17 0.54 -0.99 -1.00 0.60 0.82 -0.57
Notes: See Notes to table 5 for simulation information. Results correspond with equation (7) and 
are the impacts on national poverty reforms from the listed type of reform within the sector 
identified. Totals are the sum across instruments and reflect the total contribution for sector 
specific reforms to the national percentage change in poverty headcount. 
Source: Authors’ model simulations. 